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SADCC vs SOUTH AFRICA: Turning of the Tide? 
By Reginald Herbold Green
The struggle continues.
The dream lives.
- Mozambican Mobilising Slogans
Ten Years On
Serious thinking, data collection and analysis toward what was in 1980 to
become the Southern African Development Coordination Conference began in 
1 9 7 7 .7 8 . The process leading to formal Front Line State endorsement of
exploring the concept (in February 1979) and the Arusha pre-founding SADCC (in 
July 1979) began in late 1978. Thus while the formal tenth anniversary of
founding will be in April 1990 - after the April 1 , 1980 adoption of SADCC’s
prospectus and de facto constitution, the Lusaka Declaration - 1988 is in a
real sense the tenth year of SADCC’s existence as a process.
That makes it an appropriate time for a broad retrospective review. SADCC 
after all was born at the peak of African hopes in the twilight of the 1976-79 
SSA economic boom (average annual growth of about 6# never achieved before or 
since) and at the dawn of the Southern African dream of peaceful evolution to 
economic independence and progressive delinking from South Africa. The hopes, 
dreams and initiatives of those days are largely dead or tottering shadows of 
themselves. The UN Programme for African Economic Recovery and Development of
1986 is not the child of the 1980 Lagos Plan of Action. It is a desperate
plea for a contract with African states to alter policies and the global 
community to provide the working capital. The Secretary General’s mid-term 
report is clear and stark - Africa by and large reformed, the global 
community’s contribution is largely not UNPAERD but UNPAID. The Common Fund 
is, at best, virtually stillborn; the New International Economic Order a 
wistful memory or a macabre joke. The real prices of most African exports are 
at their lowest levels in 50 years - and of the largest, oil, back to 1940s
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real levels. RSA has made clear it has no intention of allowing peaceful 
erosion of its hegemony over the Southern African region. On UNICEF estimates 
over 1980-88 over 1,500,000 Southern Africans (about 1,600,000 including 
SADCC's occupied tenth member Namibia) died who in the absence of the total 
aggression regional aspect of RSA's "total strategy" would be alive today.
SADCC on that record should be decently interred or at most 'enjoy' the death 
in life paper survival of many of the 150 odd multi-country economic groupings 
that litter SSA. But, at least on the face of it, that is not the case. The 
Annual SADCC Conference with external cooperating partners remains a high 
profile event attracting ministers and senior officials from three score 
countries and development institutions from outside the region. The talk is 
of over $6 billion of articulated, agreed priority projects; $3 billion either 
firmly or tentatively pledged to their implementation and over $1 billion 
spent. Despite RSA's direct and proxy aggression the Indian Ocean port 
corridors seem - after 1982-84 setbacks - to be moving ahead again. Is this 
an illusion? Is SADCC really the exception - an African initiative (and a 
multi-state one at that) which, launched on the eve of a wave of disasters, 
has not merely survived but actually made significant forward progress? If 
so, how and why? And, if so why are its sharpest critics RSA (by deed) and 
the radical African intellectual left (by word) - on the face of it a most 
unlikely partnership.
The Dream: 1978-80
SADCC was founded on three goals: reduction of dependence on South Africa
rapidly; building up regional interdependence to increase the pace of 
development speedily and to reduce non-RSA external dependence gradually; to 
do this by identifying and acting on areas of perceived common political 
economic interests among its member States. Within that frame it placed 
restoration of regional transport interdependent self-reliance (broken in 
RSA's favour during UDI) at the top of the list because it saw it as the key 
to RSA's general economic hegemony and its non-military leverage over the 
independent states.
While SADCC always assumed external cooperation (it has tended to eschew the 
use of "donor" on the basis that it is inaccurate even in describing the
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totality of relationships in which financial transfers are dominantly grants) 
it believed - on the 1976-79 record - that substantial domestic resources and 
purely commercial external loans/investments could be mobilised. It also 
believed RSA while uncooperative would not risk its crucial regional exports 
by massive economic destabilisation nor engage in military adventurism against 
economic delinking.
SADCC did not see health, education (except for high and middle level 
specialised personpower development) as common interests better pursued 
regionally. However, it did believe basic economic needs had a high priority 
and that a key one (on both production income and assured supply fronts) was 
food security. Its early emphasis on drought resistant, small farmer friendly 
agricultural research development illustrates the genuineness of these 
priorities.
SADCC then did represent the Southern African dream - of economic development, 
of self-determination, of mass welfare and of winning free of South African 
domination. Its unusual structural features were not academic experiments 
(although it did have some advisers who were ex-government practitioners and 
current academics) so much as thoughtful politicians attempts to learn from 
their own and their neighbours experience. The avoidance of a dominant 
regional bureaucracy, the concentration on mutually identified common 
interests, the placing of production before trade - and of laissez faire free 
trade off the agenda, the involvement of governments working together (or with 
domestic enterprises albeit that was and to some extent remains less well 
thought out) at all stages from concept through implementation; the high 
priority to rehabilitation (disguised up to 1 9 8 4 as in 1980 that approach was 
internationally unsaleable); the determination that SADCC cooperation would be 
on a SADCC designed agenda focussed around a SADCC run conference were among 
the main unusual (or unique) elements. All were Southern African chosen - 
SADCC has intellectually been the most self-reliant and self-confident 
regional (or sub-regional) economic group in the continent and in that sense 
the truest to the spirit of the Lagos Plan of Action even if it rejected its 
neo-classical/neo-EEC free trade driven means to growing interdependence and 
reduced dependence.
By the first formal Annual Conference at Maputo in late 1980 the dream seemed 
to be a viable operating blueprint. Governmental enthusiasm in the region, a
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genuine cooperation among officials, a seriously articulated set of priority 
projects in several sectors, an external response and several hundred million 
dollars pledged. In 1981 at Blantyre concrete implementation had begun and 
articulation of a fuller set of priority project components was proceeding. 
But two small clouds warned of the nightmare to come. First South Africa had 
left a greeting card blowing up the navigation guides to Beira harbour (then 
Malawi’s key port) and three cooperating partners challenged the Communique 
reference to RSA destabilisation and sabotage and the need for the 
international community to act to deter it. Still, the first looked 
handleable and on the second point the SADCC states (and to be fair a majority 
of the cooperating partners) preserved the substance of the disputed wording. 
Similarly the economic crises already afflicting Zambia and Tanzania were seen 
as short term. By the early 1983 Conference in Maseru the picture had begun 
to change radically, and for the worse.
The Nightmare Years: 1981-86
Over 1981-86 SADCC had a curiously two aspect appearance. On the one hand the 
Conferences; the pledges; the project articulation; the development of policy 
coordination; the habit of working together; the creation of a clear regional
and international image and some project areas, e.g. telecommunications,
agricultural research moved ahead steadily. Among the most noteworthy - 
except on the last count - was transport spearheaded by the Southern African 
Transport Coordination Commission (SATCC) and coordinated by Mozambique.
But there was another side. Reduction in local resource availability and lack 
of ability to attract (or afford) commercial loans greatly raised the 
dependence on external finance; without distortion of priority proposals but 
with a distinct patchiness in ability to move on implementation. Further 
drought - endemic over 1980-1985 and recurring (together with locusts) in some 
states in 1987-88 made a mockery of food security efforts until 1985/86. 
Worst, RSA’s response had been totally misprojected (or RSA changed its 
tactics). South Africa used proxy forces and (massively in Angola, less
overtly in Mozambique) its regular armed forces to smash the regions transport 
corridors to Lobito Bay, Maputo, Beira and Nacala, and to lay waste rural
Mozambique and Angola. This kept the transport stranglehold in place (created 
it for the first time for Malawi) and increased market opportunities in and
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economic leverage over Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, Zambia and Malawi 
against whom non-military destabilisation was limited and military incursions 
apparently more brutal warnings than anything else. As a result by 1986 trade 
and transport dependence on RSA had increased; doubtless less than it would 
without SADCC but still movement in the wrong direction.
The gloomiest position came late in 19 86 after Samora's plane had followed a 
false beacon into the hills behind Nkomati. South Africa’s proxy Renamo 
seemed about to cut Mozambique in two, break the defence perimeter around the 
Beira Corridor and reduce the operational capacity of the Mozambican state to 
the vanishing point. Angola seemed unable to make progress against South 
Africa's UNITA proxy because whenever it began RSA regular forces swarmed in 
to take the pressure off their proteges. And with the collapse of oil prices 
Angola's fiscal ability to keep the rest of its economy - and its people - 
going and fight the war seemed in danger of being seriously undermined.
SADCC in one sense kept plugging the 1980 line - it did not alter goals and, 
if anything, raised the priority given to transport. But it did in fact add 
two more features. One was systematic presentation of the damage RSA was 
doing linked to demands for effective pressure on RSA (by economic sanctions 
or otherwise) to deter it. The other was the institution of a process of 
regular critical assessments of what was being done and how and what the 
obstacles to doing more, faster were. Nonetheless in the last months of 1986  
while SADCC, like Mozambique, could surely assert that "the struggle 
continues" the claim the "the dream lives" was more a desperate assertion of 
faith than a candid description of the course or state of event. But as in 
1981 reality was somewhat different - in this case better - than it appeared 
and the next twenty-four months were to see dramatic changes.
The Turning of the Tide; 198 7 - ??
The initial clawback from late 1986 was presented in the 19 8 6 - 8 7 ACR Southern 
African economic cooperation chapter. Briefly, the armed bandits of Renamo 
were broken as a serious military threat albeit their power to kill and to 
destabilise rural life remained high and as became clearer in 1988 their 
military breaking released a torrent of ex-slave labourers into Malawi nearly 
swamping its economy and food supplies as they rapidly passed the 500,000
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mark. The progress on the Beira, to a lesser extent the Nacala and - 
potentially then - the Maputo-Zimbabwe corridors began to look more promising 
and the key transport vice-breaking momentum to be moving in the right
direction again along with the economic and human viability of Mozambique. Up 
to that point no dramatic changes were apparent on the Angola front and
Namibian independence seemed to have retreated into the very hazy future.
In 1988 developments took place:
1. The 1987 Mozambique emergencia appeal proved to have been successful and 
was followed by a larger 1988 set of pledges while the economy turned up 
markedly;
2. The armed bandits were systematically broken up over ever growing swathes
of country and prospects for renewed peasant livelihoods and domestic
food supplies began to look realistic in many districts for the 1 9 8 8 / 8 9  
crop year;
3. Beira Corridor upgrading continued and although repair (even more than 
security) problems continued to keep the Nacala rail route closed some 
lorry traffic began to move. More dramatic, the Limpopo Valley 
(Maputo-Zimbabwe) line reopened and was being steadily upgraded so that 
1989 could well be the last year in which RSA transport facilities were 
vital;
4. Angola defeated South Africa's expeditionary force in front of Cuito 
Canavale and drove its airforce from Angolan skies. With its forces half 
trapped and its vital artillery park kept in being only by the stinger 
missiles it deployed around it, RSA had to negotiate a truce to pull out 
of Angola while Angola launched a major offensive against the proxy 
forces designed to cut their northern (Kamina supplied) penetration zone 
from the previously South African guarded Jamba redoubt as well as to 
begin clearing the Lobito Bay rail line;
5. As a result South Africa began - at the least - serious consideration of 
and continued (if slightly desultary) negotiation toward allowing a UN 
supervised independence process in Namibia in 1989 or 1990.
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Clearly not all of this is SADCC's doing any more than was the increased food 
security following good 1986 harvests. But its contribution - except on the 
strictly military front where the Front Line States and peripherally Malawi 
were key - has not been negligible.
Mozambique’s emergence from being cold shouldered to one of the West’s 
’favourite’ African states has multiple causes. One is Mozambique's skillful 
diplomacy and presentation of its own case year after year. Another is the 
almost incredible beastliness of RSA's proxy Renamo combined with the absence 
of any non-African operational forces on the Mozambican side. A third is the 
work of other external friends in putting Mozambique’s case, e.g. in UNICEF's 
1987 Children On The Front Line. But SADCC's dogged presentation of regional 
priorities and projects many of which were in Mozambique as well as 
Mozambique's performance in SADCC especially in its transport and 
communication sector coordination role played a part.
Certainly SADCC kept the transport rehabilitation programme going when it 
appeared a Sisyphean labour with RSA destruction outpacing SADCC construction.
Without that the security improvement of 19 8 7 - 8 8 would have had no ongoing 
rehabilitation process to further. And the firm scheduling of a Lobito 
Corridor technical/financial meeting for 1989 clearly demonstrates what is 
intended next.
Not merely the successes - partial and at risk as they are and as SADCC and 
its member States know them to be - but the manner of winning them has gone 
far to raise morale. South Africa and its proxies have been defeated 
militarily, the myth of unvincibility is dead. In Mozambique the armed 
bandits were smashed wholly by FLS forces albeit in parallel cooperating 
partners have begun to move toward providing "project security" and 
"non-lethal military" support. The South African economy is growing about }% 
a year since 1980 - far worse than SADCC - and is increasingly constrained by 
economic sanctions even if not necessarily those expected or sought by SADCC. 
The dogged plugging away on transport is beginning to pay off and to allow 
valuing progress in communications, agriculture research, animal disease 
control, energy, airline schedule coordination, etc., more highly now the 
central area they are to complement is itself forging ahead. Both the critics 
who said SADCC was wrong to "confront" South Africa even peaceable and those 
who argued it had no intent to do so nor to save Mozambique begin to look like
false prophets.
Just as SADCC did not succumb to despair in 1982-86 so it appears to be 
prudently avoiding euphoria today. It knows South Africa can strike again and 
may well be reorganising itself to do just that. Equally it knows that 
security is far from restored and that massive financing and technical
barriers remain before the Maputo, Nacala and Beira - let alone the Lobito Bay
- corridors are fully, sustainably operational. Its second regional economic
survey will almost certainly show progress since the first (presented in early 
1986) but also underline continuing sluggish performance, structrual obstacles 
to restoring rapid development and a grim international economic context now 
with few signs of basic improvement. But it may well also cite 5% as an 
attainable average regional growth path - something it could not realistically 
have done (and did not) in 19 8 6.
The 1988 Annual Conference and After
In 1 9 8 8 SADCC's Annual Conference returned to Arusha where the 1979
pre-founding ’test1 conference had been held. No longer an experiment the 
Conference in one sense was featured by continuity not change. Sober sectoral 
studies; new and revised project proposals; frank regional presentations of 
progress and problems, needs and achievements; a good deal of give and take on 
ways, means and details; generally supportive cooperating partner statements - 
all were there as they have been from Maputo in 1980. True the 1987 emphasis 
on directly productive sectors and enterprise involvement was high profile but 
even that was for the second year and had been preceded by lower key (and in 
some cases in separate sectoral fora) precursors from 1984 onward.
But is that necessarily a criticism? SADCC Annual Conferences have their 
limitations but they do work. Cooperating partners have put them in their 
calendar and do come prepared to discuss and to make at least tentative 
commitments. The sectoral papers provide a target date and a showcase for new 
projects and the lead paper and Chairman’s speeches play a similar role for 
main policy priorities and regional political economic perceptions. SADCC's 
image is publicised internationally and regionally. At the latter level 
followup is now increasing, especially in Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Zambia 
articles on some aspect of SADCC's work often appear two to five times a week
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year round and "SADCC" and 11 the SADCC region" are ubiquitous terms. Funds are 
mobilised, routes to concrete negotiation identified (or pursued outside the 
main meeting), support is consolidated and SADCC's ability to take the lead on 
regional development issues regionally and with cooperating partners 
reaffirmed. Doubtless improvements can be made - one or two are tried out 
each year and retained or dropped on the basis of results. But basically the 
Conference is and remains a success and needs, for the time being, 
safeguarding and steady marginal improvement and novelty features not massive 
structural reform.
But in one way 1988 was different. About $1 ,000 million in new money was 
pledged. That is a record and when negotiated into bankable commitments to 
agreed projects will raise these by almost 50% over 1980-87 firm commitments. 
SADCC does not set vast stock in pledges until they become commitments but 
their marked rise in 1988 does have its own meaning. It is - however implicit 
- a collective statement by cooperating partners that they both accept that 
SADCC is focussing in practicable ways on real issues and viable projects and 
that they see concrete results flowing from the funds it has deployed to date. 
The international community too sees a sharp change for the better in the 
region since 1986 and apparently is willing to raise its support to keep that 
change moving on the economic front.
By mid-1987 SADCC agreed projects had reached 493 (out of perhaps 1,000 
submitted) with estimated total financial requirements of $6,400 million (65% 
for Transport and Communication). Of that total just under 35$ - $2,165 
million - was secured ( 7 2 for Transport and Communications) and another 5$ - 
$322.5 million - was under negotiation. About $1,000 million had already been 
invested and indeed a significant number of capital projects as well as 
studies were complete and in operation.
As of the end of 1988 the total sought is likely to be approaching $7,500 
million; that secured and under negotiation to have reached $3,000 million and 
disbursement/implementation to be closing on $1,500 million. Too little and 
with too long a lag is fair comment but it is easy to forget that at Maputo in 
1980 SADCC envisaged $2,000 million over up to 10 years as the highest 
reasonably projectable level of commitments a level already reached in nominal 
terms by mid-1987 and probably to be surpassed in real as well before the end 
of 1990. In that respect at least SADCC "optimism" (as most viewed it at the
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time) was well based. Compared to national projects SADCC's commitment 
pipeline is high but it has an abnormally high proportion of long lead time 
large projects and, equally to the point, of South African aggression barriers 
to prompt action in much of the dominant transport sector. On the whole 
funding sources do find SADCC context negotiations and procedures at least as
practical, efficient and expeditous as all but the best national ones and also
see improvement in disbursement rates over time. Hardly a cause for three 
cheers but also not one for believing that the process is bogging down or 
headed in the wrong direction - two cheers on fund mobilisation and a fraction 
over one on use rates perhaps.
Pragmatic Is As Pragmatic Does
SADCC has both benefitted and suffered from being both praised and damned as 
"pragmatic". The term appears to be used not so much loosely as both
unthinkingly and contradictorily.
To argue that SADCC is pragmatic and that massive reduction of dependence on 
South Africa especially in transport is undesirable and/or impossible is to 
contradict oneself. If SADCC has adhered firmly to any goal - and it has - it 
is breaking the post 1965 creation of transport dependence as the keystone in 
its arc of regional hegemony. South Africa's transport barons and its
intellectuals in waiting (notably Kissinger manque Deon Geldenhuys) and 
SADCC's spokesmen do see the future of the South and Southern African regions 
as turning on that struggle. Year after year, project after project, 
destroyed line after destroyed line SADCC has grimly, doggedly persisted. 
Today it sees more trains rolling and more donor funds rolling in. It has 
continued the struggle - the dream lives and is taking on palpable reality. 
That is just as much a comment on left maximalist critics who decry lack of a 
uniform political line, of clear commitment to socialism, of rapid progress to 
free trade (an odd left goal that) and the presence of donor finance and of 
financial supporters who will not back sanctions against apartheid or whose 
Mozambique and Angola stances are contradictory.
To them SADCC's "pragmatism" is a curse, a barrier to the New Jerusalem, a 
sell-out to imperialism.
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In terms of basic goals SADCC has held fast to its founding Lusaka Declaration 
and its main programmatic priorities even when the going has been hard or 
regional agreement on a highest common denominator hard to come by. Doubtless 
specific project lists have changed albeit the key project clusters of 1980 
are still there in 1988 and often (e.g. all the port corridors except Lobito 
Bay) moved well on the way to completion or even (e.g. earth satellite 
stations) over 100$ of initial goals. Policy coordination (e.g. integrated 
regional air flight scheduling, common transit documentation) have moved 
upward in priority but within the initial and gradually articulated/adopted 
frame of overall goals and sectoral priorities.
Where SADCC is pragmatic is not about ends but about means and especially 
verbal means and choices of partners. The changing sequencing of transport 
corridors (in the face of changing military contexts) illustrates the former 
point. The resolute use of a businesslike tone tied to careful analysis and 
potentially practicable propositions is the core of the second. SADCC does 
not deal in standard international conference mumbling - its documents are 
readable and have a style - but it is not a platform for ringing declamations 
and blazing rhetoric. And - because without funds facts cannot be built on 
the ground - SADCC does accept support so long as (and only so long as) it is 
for a priority project, carries no strings inconsistent with the project's 
purposes and is not packaged in such a way as to threaten regional working 
unity.
The test case for critics and admirers has been the USA. SADCC has clearly 
taken the view that subject to the conditions noted the USA was an acceptable 
partner despite "constructive engagement" with South Africa and "destructive 
engagement" with RSA's UNITA proxy. The results are not intangible: major
funding for agricultural research and for the Mozambican, Tanzanian and 
Zambian segments of the transport sector and potentially for trade sector
revolving funds. But USA attempts to negative tie aid in 1984-85 (ironically 
then against Mozambique and Tanzania as well as Angola) were met by a clear 
warning to change at least to specifying positively or to have the funds 
rejected. The revised approach was made (and Mozambique and Tanzania soon
thereafter added to the recipients list). Pragmatic, yes, but hardly absent
minded or unprincipled.
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Where Is The Trade?
SADCC's trade sector has progressed slowly for four reasons:
1. SADCC’s top priorities have been transport and communications, food
security and energy in that order both on paper and in time devoted, 
actions taken and resources mobilised;
2. SADCC genuinely believes trade expansion is a result of production
coordination and expansion not a central means to achieving it, i.e. it
takes production as basic and exchange as consequential (which is not to 
say trivial);
3. Because the neo-classical, neo-EEC road to common market models have a 
uniform record of limited to non-success (except at raising discord among 
economic group member states) in Africa, SADCC has sought more
diversified, more information and access based and more enterprise 
grounded approaches and has faced problems in identifying and 
articulating them;
4. As there is already one broader, looser coverage trade oriented body - 
the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African States - 
SADCC has no desire to duplicate or conflict in the tariff and hard 
currency clearing house areas but has problems in achieving a consensus 
beyond that because traditionally the PTA and its godfather, the Economic 
Commission for Africa have been overtly anti-SADCC and at least one SADCC 
Member State is in principle opposed to joining PTA (while two others are 
not yet members).
SADCC recognises that trade expansion is crucial and hopes that the steady 
series of studies and talks will lead to a substantive programme - as they 
have led to the formal creation (in 1985) of a Trade Sector with Tanzania as 
coordinating country. Member State interest is growing because at least four 
states - Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and Tanzania see regional export expansion 
as crucial to the rehabilitation (or continuity) of capacity utilisation 
levels and broadening of the base of their manufacturing sectors as well as a 
significant route to expanding import capacity.
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Industrial harmonisation (at the least avoiding massive regional overcapacity 
creation), better regional information flows on availabilities - sources - 
prices, better supporting transport and communications, revolving funds to 
cover the pre-export import costs of export production, frame trade target 
agreements with clearing and adjustment mechanisms other than hard currency 
settlement all have had serious attention, some degree of articulation and - 
in most cases - at least some progress. That progress - like the intra SADCC 
dialogue on which it is built - appears to be cumulative without the dangers 
of imbalances leading to self-destruct mechanisms which have characterised 
previous trade areas involving SADCC Member States. But it is painfully slow 
to date and has damped rather than halted aberrational nationalist outbursts 
notably the Zimbabwe trade authorities' imposition of restrictions on imports 
from Botswana and Malawi both of which are key markets and with both of which 
Zimbabwe enjoys a trade surplus (abstracting from Botswana metal matte
exported to Zimbabwe, refined and exported from Zimbabwe as metal).
Trade is a problematic area especially because there does not yet seem to be a 
working understanding of two points:
1. no country will sign a blank cheque in forex, thus some degree of balance 
(or agreed imbalance) must be a target with means other than hard 
currency transfers to redress overshoots of imbalance;
2. the purpose of exports is basically to finance imports so that states and 
enterprises should seek regional sources as diligently as regional
markets.
Multi Not Supranational
SADCC is avowedly multinational not supranational. While the word conference 
in its title is an historic anachronism it is true that SADCC as such and
SADCC area independent groups (of trade unions, bankers, chambers of commerce,
etc) confer to coordinate. The reasons for this approach may not be heroic 
but they are hard-headed and oriented toward achieving actual coordinated 
action in the existing context:
effective supranationalism would be acceptable to no SADCC member State;
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so that a formally supranational body would have powers in name only or 
be confined to areas of no real concern to the members;
2. without direct government leadership and involvement at all stages and 
levels of decision taking, 'decisions' do not get implemented nor do 
states develop a habit of working together;
3. all SADCC states do perceive themselves as having common interests more 
effectively pursued in common (albeit the lists of the nine states are 
overlapping not identical) and are willing to seek to articulate, decide 
and mobilise resources to act in pursuance of them.
This approach does delay progress when states disagree on what the common 
interest is or how to proceed on it. That is one reason for slow progress in 
the trade sector. But at least when action is agreed upon it does tend to be 
taken, because it has been negotiated out [???] and agreed by all concerned 
member States. Concerned is the operative word - SADCC can (and does) proceed 
if a sector or a project concerns several (for a sector) or two (for a 
project) states so long as there is no substantive objection.
A potential danger is "buggins turn", i.e. forced equalisation of projects and 
posts such as the EEC practices on technical assistance contracts to ACP 
states with results which can be laughable, so long as one does not consider 
the damage to the 'beneficiary' ACP state landed with buggins. To date SADCC 
has avoided this. True every member State has had an Annual Conference and a 
Ministerial Meeting and most have had a Summit. Equally each has a 
(self-chosen) programme area to coordinate and promote. But that sharing adds 
little to cost and much to feeling of involvement. In the selection of 
projects artificial 'balancing' has been avoided. Unsound projects have been 
rejected (about half of submissions taking all sectors together) and no 
totting up of total projects per country either sectorally or overall has ever 
been part of SADCC's operating process. This is a potential future problem 
but not a present drag on efficiency (as it very much was in the old East 
African community).
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Light Superstructure: Cost Minimisation or Expertise Limitation?
SADCC is regularly praised (and damned) for having lean (limited) community 
institutions. The praise sees this as avoiding bureaucracy and ensuring that 
decisions are taken by states which understand and intend to act on them not 
prestidigitated out of them by bureaucrats- with no power to implement and no 
real state commitment to draw upon. The condemnation sees SADCC as unable to 
transcend a least common denominator or to act decisively partly because 
technical expertise and leadership is lacking at the centre. The reality is 
more complex than either simplification recognises.
First, this an area in which SADCC thinking and practice has evolved, 
pragmatically if one likes. The Secretariat remains small but is approaching 
ten professionals and does offer suggestions for action, handle certain 
initiatives well beyond initial draft stage, play an international diplomatic 
role and both by regular reports and special studies assess results, strengths 
and weaknesses. This is a broader role than formally envisaged in 1979-80 but 
one endorsed as it evolved by the SADCC official and ministerial bodies.
Second, SADCC is closer to acting on a highest common denominator (i.e. a 
position no member State will choose to dissent from when set out by SADCC) 
than on a lowest common denominator. Its spokespersons at all levels do speak 
on SADCC's behalf in ways which are more regional than and at least subtly 
different from what they would choose to say in their national capacities. 
SADCC positions, stands and priorities do exist and - in some cases - are more 
than the sum of the national components.
Third, SADCC never objected to technical support bodies for agreed Sectoral
Programme Areas. These now total nearly 100 professionals. Here the problem 
as most SADCC member States perceive is that some are too small, too weak 
and/or too passive. (Tanzania on manufacturing and trade has been especially 
sharply criticised within the region on these counts.) In no case has a
coordinating state or its secretariat really been accused of being
dictatorial, of pursuing national not regional interests or of having too 
large a staff too detached from the coordination of national projects and 
policies process.
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The strength of coordinated national involvement has been married to achieving 
a highest common denominator and a distinctive regional voice. The central 
secretariat has achieved a substantive, influential role while remaining 
small. But the technical secretariats vary very much in strength and the 
under-staffing and financing of some is increasingly seen as a real and, in 
certain key sectors, potentially very damaging brake on progress.
External Dependence and Self Determination
External dependence reduction - "especially but not only on the Republic of 
South Africa" - is a basic SADCC goal. Overdependence not only as to funding 
but also as to concept, programme content and procedure is the commonest - 
usually but not always radical - criticism of SADCC. The criticism has 
several facets:
1. 86# of project finance sought as of mid-1987 was identified as foreign 
and a significant share of technical secretariat expenses is also foreign 
financed;
2. SADCC purportedly was teleguided into being by the EEC (albeit some right 
wing critics have nominated the USSR) to serve imperialist interests and 
block genuine sub-regional economic cooperation (presumably the PTA);
3. programmes - or at least the items implemented - are set out by funding 
sources;
M. SADCC has no political or military project, includes South African 
satellites and operates on a least common denominator approach which in 
practice allows external emasculation and its use as an alternative to 
sanction’s against South Africa;
5. SADCC refuses to accept free trade as the core of economic integration
thereby proving it is the plaything of external experimenters or forces 
wishing to ensure it has no serious dependence reducing impact.
It should be made clear that not all - or even a majority - of African 
radicals and especially not among those in the SADCC region would or do take
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an anti-SADCC position and that the weight to be given to the foregoing 
charges is distinctly uneven. A preliminary point is that SADCC views overall 
dependence reduction as necessarily a long process and dependence shifting and 
diversification away from South Africa as a first step. Similarly it views 
more global exports (to reduce aid dependence) as complementary to not 
competitive with regional interdependence ánd intertrade development. SADCC 
may of course be wrong but critics rarely address these positions at all.
That 86$ of investible funds from abroad is too high a proportion is contested 
by nobody - surely not by SADCC. (In fact the true proportion is probably 
not over 80$, presentation in a format designed to mobilise external resources 
tends to overlook related domestic funding but 80$ is still very high.) Nor 
is it what SADCC expected in 1980. The reason is short if not sweet; economic 
recession and South African aggression have so eroded SADCC member State 
import and investment capacity as to make the real choice not between 80$ and 
40$ foreign funding but between a substantial, basically foreign funded 
programme and a basically domestically funded programme too small to have any 
impact before member States gave up on SADCC as a good idea thwarted by 
recession and South Africa. On technical secretariats and related projects 
SADCC has adopted formulae and time tables for phasing in domestic finance and 
personnel.
SADCC was not founded by anybody except the Front Line States Heads of State 
slightly later joined by their Lesotho, Swaziland and Malawi counterparts. It 
represents in large part a reaction against externally (including Addis Ababa) 
designed sub-regional structures and a deliberate identification of areas 
which the states perceived as embodying common interests best pursued jointly. 
SADCC's good relations with most external sources of finance (Japan and the 
CMEA countries are to date fairly obvious exceptions) relate both to a need to 
collect funds (not debating points) and a commitment to the approach once 
aphorised by then President Nyerere as "argue don't shout".
The danger of those who finance determining priorities is one of which SADCC 
is deeply conscious. To date it has not happened on project selection and not 
centrally or systematically on projects financed and implemented as compared 
to those proposed. The least well financed area is national food security 
projects with a regional aspect because not only external funders but SADCC 
doubt how integrally these have been built into a set of regional priorities;
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per contra the transport sector has a higher proportion of commitments than of 
total funds sought and its least financed project cluster - Lobito Bay - is 
clearly held back by physical inability to proceed to date more than any 
external bias in principle.
For SADCC to seek a joint political programme (whether to neo-laissez faire 
capitalism or to socialism) would be a recipe for its own dissolution. That 
may be an inconvenient fact but it is a fact. SADCC is an economic body - in 
many ways the economic arm of the Front Line States. Security cooperation is 
assigned to the FLS not to SADCC. As already argued SADCC seeks - with some 
success - to operate on a highest common denominator approach and to help the 
more cautious of its members evolve away from their present degree of 
closeness to RSA; not it should be said with no results even if the pace is 
slow and the gains to date limited. SADCC can hardly be said to have offered 
itself as a soft alternative to sanctions - it has in fact urged their 
adoption. Granted some funders do seem to see funding SADCC projects (and to 
a degree SADCC State self-defence against RSA and its proxies) as an 
alternative to sanctions. SADCC does not condone or agree with this but no 
SADCC country to date has suggested refusing the funds would hurt South Africa 
or bring sanctions nearer. As to membership it needs to be recalled SADCC has 
named its tenth member - Namibia on independence - and rejected an alternative 
(Zaire) at least partly on the grounds its commitment to reducing dependence 
on RSA was less than apparent. The Liberation Movements (ANC, SWAPO, PAC) do 
not seem to agree that SADCC is wishy-washy or worse on South Africa and since 
1986 have spoken at the Annual Conference.
SADCC's non-allegiance to a neo-EEC road to economic integration is an odd 
reason for asserting it is foreign guided especially as repeated speeches by 
SADCC member State Ministers make abundantly clear that this is a Southern 
African decision based on experience that free trade divides partners and 
causes communities based on it to stall or implode. Historically and 
empirically that judgement is correct. Logically so is the perception that 
trade follows and validates production coordination rather than leading or 
causing it - very much a practising politician's not an academic or 
bureaucrat's insight. That SADCC has been slow on developing a substantial 
trade programme is clear but - as discussed above - this weakness (which SADCC 
describes it as being) does not relate to external influence but to real
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problems of identifying substantial, relevant, financeable measures and 
achieving a working regional consensus on them.
In short, SADCC would be the first to say it has fallen short of its own 
targets in speed of dependence reduction (especially on RSA) and in raising 
finance. It would view claims of foreign manipulation either as identifying 
dangers of which it was well aware or as unfounded (and often self-serving) 
allegations barely deserving attention. On the issue of how much, how fast it 
is evident that some critics hoped (or hope) SADCC could be the highroad to a 
New Jerusalem (usually but not always seen by the critics as some variant of 
socialism) validating their views of what ought to be. SADCC views itself as 
engaged in achieving actual results and building up momentum toward priority 
targets not conducting utopian experiments for those far from decision taking 
experience (and often far from Southern Africa). This is not an area of 
tension in SADCC. One might suppose Angola and Mozambique are no less eager
for speed and for a greater degree of non-capitalist development in some of
their partners than the idealist critics but believe attempting to force the 
pace or to export national political economic projects would be
counterproductive. They may, of course, be misjudging the limits of the 
possible but ultra caution and ultra conservatism and risk avoidance are 
rarely argued to be typical of these states in other contexts.
The Price of Pretoria
The dominant economic fact of life for the SADCC region as a whole - and 
especially for Mozambique and Angola - is South African economic 
destabilisation/military aggression. The decision makers of South Africa 
decided - after initial hesitiation, perhaps to see whether SADCC was for real 
- SADCC was a major obstacle to ensuring that Southern Africa was to be kept 
dependent so as to be a safe shield and a vital export market for apartheid. 
Reversing the 1965-1980 buildup of transport dependence was viewed as
particularly threatening and when the 1979-81 lull in RSA's active 
destabilisation/aggression total regional strategy ended transport projects 
were key targets for RSA kommandos and for the Renamo and UNITA proxy forces.
SADCC, as noted, had foreseen hostility but not major destabilisation 
(economic sanctions against SADCC) let alone massive military aggression.
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Perhaps it should have, but it did not. After its initial shock it began to 
develop responses. One was to call attention to the economic damage South 
Africa was doing. Over time this presentation became more systematic and 
detailed and in 1984 SADCC produced the first overall reasoned, broken down 
economic loss calculations - $10,120 million over 1980-84 or more than total 
gross external finance to the countries of the region over the period, almost 
half of 1984 gross regional product and more than 1984 regional exports.
Through 1986 the SADCC figure - with amendments and projections - remained the 
base for estimating the economic price Pretoria's praetorians imposed on the 
region in order to protect apartheid and its export markets. They were 
overtaken in 1987 by calculations done for UNICEF'S Children On The Front Line 
which showed 1980-86 GDP losses as of the order of $25,000 million or the 
equivalent of 1986 achieved GDP's for the region. SADCC, having brought the 
issue to prominence, has chosen to let other bodies do the subsequent 
calculations. As 1988 drew to a close the Economic Commission for Africa had 
a detailed economic and human cost study nearing completion and UNICEF was 
editing an updated, expanded and extended (to Namibia) edition of Children On 
The Front Line.
There is reason to believe that the two estimates are relatively similar and 
that UNICEF'S are of the order of $60,000 million over 1980-88 in lost GDP 
valued at 1988 prices with the annual loss over $10,000 million (well over a 
third of achieved GDP) and rising. Apparently post 1986 changes and more 
thorough calculations indicate that while perhaps half the loss is Angolan and 
a quarter Mozambican the total for the other seven states is very substantial 
and in the cases of Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia and Tanzania seriously depresses 
their achieved growth rates.
That SADCC - and the most severely hit two of its member States in particular 
- have survived this burden (although UNICEF estimates suggest 1,500,000 of 
their citizens have died in consequence of South Africa's "destructive 
engagement" with Southern Africa) is testimony to a very high level of 
determination. That from 1986 progress has been renewed is to say the least 
surprising as are the 1985-88 regional growth rates of 2.5 to 3*5$ a year 
either absolutely or in contrast to RSA's 1$ or less and the overall 2% of 
SSA.
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PTA: Competitor or Complement?
To discuss PTA in the context of a ten year review of SADCC runs the risk of 
appearing to be dismissive or hostile. This is especially the case because 
PTA advocates have in the past, although much less so today, been overtly 
hostile to SADCC leaving a legacy of caution or even distrust on the part of 
many involved in the SADCC process. However, such an interpretation is less 
than fair to which is indeed different but in potentially complementary rather
than competitive ways. Several points are relevant:
1. PTA - despite a gestation period going back to 1966 - is younger than 
SADCC and became operational only in 1984;
2. PTA's membership from Mauritius to (potentially) Angola and Lesotho to 
Ethiopia (and potentially Sudan) is much further flung, with less 
pre-existing links or habits of cooperation than is SADCC which in one 
sense emerged from FLS cooperation dating to 1965;
3. The driving, high profile political economic imperative driving SADCC - 
to break South African economic hegemony and transport vice together or 
be broken by them singly - has no equally dramatic counterpart in PTA;
4. PTA's neo-EEC model Treaty is not in practice either adequately 
prioritised or adequately flexible;
5. PTA's members have not in practice given it the priority attention and 
support or sought to involve themselves as fully in its processes as have 
SADCC's;
6. trade liberalism and conventional clearing arrangements, without prior 
transport and communications development or production coordination, are 
not the strongest of central instruments with which to achieve rapid, 
high profile results;
7. PTA has reversed three initial contentious stands now seeing external 
funding properly used as a vital component not a barrier to regional 
integration, RSA's aggression and means to counter it as priority topics
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for PTA and a variety of forms of trade promotion and balancing (not 
merely the neo-classical ones) as potentially useful within or parallel
to the PTA framework;
8. the potential problem of SADCC Member PTA states discriminating against
fellow SADCC Member Non PTA states (a clear break of the Lusaka
Declaration which is prior to the PTA Treaty) could be averted were all 
SADCC member States to join PTA (as 6 have done, 2 are actively
considering and the last is beginning to contemplate).
That said PTA's results to date are more formal than fully opeational. 
Tariffs have been preferentially reduced and rules of origin agreed but while 
intra PTA trade is 6$ of all members' trade (vs a 4$ African average and a PTA 
starting point of 4 to 5$) it is very peripheral to most members because the 
bulk is accounted for by Zimbabwe-Botswana, Zambabwe-Malawi, Kenya-Uganda and 
Kenya-Tanzania flows. There is a process of buildup and diversification 
exemplified by Mauritius's recent imports of light bulbs from Zambia but it is 
painfully slow.
PTA has created a standard Clearing House for intra-member trade. However it 
still handles only about 15$ of visible trade transactions within PTA (perhaps 
10$ of visibles and invisibles) and by automatic hard currency settlement 
within 90 days does little to encourage exporters to view higher sourcing from 
their partners as the key to sustained regional trade expansion. Further, its 
interaction with export retentions on foreign currency earning exports has 
been anomalous - in a number of cases these are not or only partially given on 
PTA bound exports thus making it an unpreferred market for enterprises seeking 
to export. These problems are exacerbated (and the cross cancelling gains of 
clearing reduced) because PTA exports are dominated by two states (Kenya and 
Zimbabwe) and in very few cases does cross cancelling result in serious hard 
currency use savings.
The conflict between PTA's overly optimistic adoption of a variant of the 
Andean Pact's limits on eligibility of firms with majority external ownership, 
management or control and the realities of how fast its members can 
domesticate key firms has been defused by extending interim waivers and 
providing a graduated scale of preferences to replace the initial all or 
nothing division. But how to reconcile diversification (likely to involve
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high initial foreign finance and personnel inputs) and a viable set of 
incentives to domesticate still appears to be a question with no articulated 
answer.
PTA has set up committees in sectoral areas roughly comparable to those of 
SADCC. But it is hard to identify any operational results to date. Trade 
documentation coordination has been spearheaded by an UNCTAD unit based in 
Malawi and transit corridor development from the Indian Ocean to Zaire, 
Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda by ad hoc groupings of the user states much more 
than by PTA.
Similarly PTA's trade finance bank remains de facto unfunded and with few 
signs it will attract substantial external soft money injections. The idea is 
sound but PTA members cannot mobilise adequate domestic funds (let alone 
forex) and the PTA is not (or not yet) on external governments list of 
institutions with priority in resource allocations.
Finally, PTA's 1988 moves to identify how trade could increase regional 
self-reliance, reduce the impact of RSA's present sanctions against PTA member 
enterprises and increase ability to cope with potential restrictions on 
RSA-PTA member trade assumes the transport problem is solved. This may be 
taken as a compliment to SADCC but it remains a premature one.
And yet - the tariff preferehces exist and are being built up; there is trade 
growth; the clearing house operates; there is room for sectoral coordination 
especially among the Northern (non-SADCC) PTA members and in areas in which 
SADCC is not active, e.g. regional water transport; the PTA has survived and 
has maintained a dogged optimism that in time its work to date will bear much 
more fruit.
That is not self-evidently an unreasonable view. Four years is a very short 
time to get a massive trade buildup in the face of import capacity crises, 
ingrained sourcing habits, poor transport and communication and little 
enterprise knowledge of regional sources or markets (albeit PTA's regional 
trade fair programme may be beginning to contribute to overcoming the last 
barrier).
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Further detailed, multiple sector integration and clearing/barrier reduction 
focussed trade development bodies probably have different optimal memberships. 
The former needs a limited number of states with many perceived common 
interests. The latter needs as broad a market area as practicable. On that 
basis PTA and SADCC each has about the right actual or potential membership 
base.
Four actions might strengthen the PTA and PTA-SADCC complementarity to the 
benefit of both and, more to the point, their member States;
1. all SADCC members joining PTA to end the potentially explosive situation 
of SADCC state's imposing discriminatory trade barriers against each 
other in a few years time;
2. SADCC and PTA agreeing a division of labour especially in trade but also
in transport and manufacturing;
3. the two bodies coordinating their main initiatives both at Secretariat
and Ministerial levels;
4. PTA's domesticating its Treaty toward clearer priorities, less far flung
but non-operational ambitions, greater flexibility and more integral
state involvement in initiating and formulating action proposals and 
programmes.
The PTA is right to say it needs and deserves more time. But - especially in 
the absence of the foregoing actions - it may not have the time. It is a 
brutal fact that organisations with major long term goals but very small 
concrete short term results do not hold on to their constituencies for very 
long. African governments demand quick, substantial, concrete results (or at 
least steadily growing tangible foretastes of them) and if they do not get 
them put the institution they see as having failed to deliver on the periphery 
of their priorities and attention neither dissolving it nor giving it the 
resources to achieve a breakthrough. In that context the PTA is running a 
race against time and its success remains problematic.
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